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TOPICS  ABOUT
On September 28th, California Governor Jerry Brown
signed a new law that forbids the surreptitious use
of bots to, among other things, influence Californians’
votes in an election. The law is a disclosure rule: the
bot may speak, but it must clearly identify itself as
nonhuman.
Critics have suggested that California’s new law is
vague and unworkable and will stifle legitimate
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speech. The First Amendment looms large in this
debate.
But before rushing to First Amendment judgment
about a law regulating speech, it is worth pausing to
consider the gravity of the risks the law seeks to
contain, and to ask if a commitment to free speech
precludes efforts to address those risks. California’s
law stems from growing alarm about our ability to tell
what is real from what is fake when we talk politics. As
computers become ever-more sophisticated at
producing them, we face a reality in which our
marketplace of ideas is increasingly flooded
with counterfeits.
And bots are the least of our problems. Cheap and
publicly available software will very soon be capable
of producing hyper-realistic videos of candidates for
office saying things they did not in fact say. Shouldn’t
a state be able to prohibit this deception just as it
prohibits counterfeit cash from circulating?
Plenty of laws confront the problem of counterfeits
outside the political realm. We have a long history of
policing them. It is illegal to circulate fake money.
Sellers of fake goods – even or especially when they
are of the same quality as originals – violate consumer
protection and trademark laws. Criminal laws punish
posing as a police officer to get out of a speeding
ticket. The urge to prohibit fraud in these contexts
makes sense.
In a forthcoming article, I explore whether a ban
“counterfeit campaign speech” is constitutionally
possible. A ban on counterfeit campaign speech would
address the manufacture of fake images or audio of an
identifiable candidate for public office to create a false
appearance that the candidate has done or said
something that he or she has not done or said. It
would prohibit only fakes produced with knowing or
reckless disregard of fake-ness and an intent to harm a
candidate’s chance of electoral success, mislead voters,
and undermine the electoral process.
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The problem with such a prohibition is that courts
have consistently held that, though we can ban frauds
and counterfeits in other contexts, elections are
different. When it comes to political speech, the First
Amendment severely and appropriately curtails efforts
to combat deception. Court after court has ruled that
attempts to prevent lies in political campaigns chill
speech and put the state in the impossible position of
discerning truth from falsity. Far better to let the
marketplace of ideas sort out what is true and what is
not when it comes to politics.
Banning counterfeit campaign speech therefore feels
like a radical proposition. But a careful reading of
cases like New York Times v. Sullivan reveals that the
Supreme Court does not extend First Amendment
immunity to calculated falsehood that wreaks specific
and identifiable harm. Assuming that a prohibition of
counterfeit campaign speech reaches only fraudulent
speech that is knowingly so, no First Amendment
protections should attach. This argument has not won
the day when it comes to regular lies. But faked speech
is different than a regular lie—it’s fraud. And scholars
who have examined laws banning lies in political
campaigns have left the door open
to narrow prohibition. A prohibition of faked
candidate speech could fit that bill.
California’s bot disclosure statute may skirt First
Amendment scrutiny since it does not ban or penalize
speech; it requires only that bots disclose their non-
humanity. Thus far, the Supreme Court has
supported disclosure requirements against First
Amendment challenges in a variety of campaigning
contexts. A broad law banning bot speech outright
would be unlikely to pass a First Amendment test.
But the same should not be so for a law imposing
individual liability for intentionally faked candidate
speech—at issue is not the means by which a message
is conveyed but whether it is an intentional fake.
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The trouble is that even if a ban on counterfeit
campaign speech survived constitutional scrutiny, a
prohibition would still face numerous practical
hurdles. Identifying the source of faked speech or even
that it is fake is tricky business (though
not impossible). It is not at all clear that the
government is capable of policing counterfeit
campaign speech even if a law were on the books.
Critics have expressed similar reservations about the
enforcement of California’s bot disclosure law, for
example the risks it poses to unmasking anonymous
speakers.
Given this, maybe a ban on counterfeit campaign
speech is futile, especially amidst the deluge of
misinformation already drenching voters. But why not
flip the narrative? Why not assume that protecting
voters from counterfeits is even more important than
protecting consumers from fake Nikes? Our
democracy may depend on it.
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